UK Tobacco and Vapes Bill: why so many are wrong to support it

The UK Tobacco and Vapes Bill continues its zombie trudge towards the statute books with virtually no opposition and, apparently, with the support of 1,200 “health leaders”, according to The Guardian.  Here is the letter, along with who qualifies as a health leader [affiliations]. 

I have no idea why there is so much support for this legislation—it can’t be on its merits. I agree that it is essential to regulate the tobacco and nicotine market. However, this legislation—and, importantly, the policy intent behind it—is dreadful and likely to do more harm than good.

The logic of uncritical support must be: something must be done; this is something; we must do this. It’s the kind of thinking that led to the snus ban in the late ’80s and, in the EU, in 1992. 20 million EU citizens have died from smoking-related disease since then. All this time, a far safer product that has been responsible for reducing smoking to 5% in Sweden was banned. The Bill isn’t a ban, but my message to these “health leaders”: beware what you wish for.

What’s wrong with the Bill? In short:

1. Nothing-burger. The “smoke-free generation” measure will have a negligible effect ever, and no effect until 2044, even under the government’s ridiculous assumptions about the effectiveness of age restrictions and the base case: what would happen if the age limit were not changed or increased to 21. Young people (age 16 or less today) are never going to smoke for the decades necessary to become seriously ill from smoking. Either now or before they reach middle age, they will switch to much safer nicotine products or quit. It is a nothing-burger. In addition, it raises issues of principle: it is an adult-only prohibition measure, it is vulnerable to unintended consequences, and it is at risk of repeal before it has time to take effect (1 January 2031, if the base case age limit were raised to 21). It would be much better to just raise the legal age for sale to 21 —a politically feasible and stable move —and recognise the real-world limitations of controlling behaviours through age restrictions.

2. Wrong target population. The smoke-free generation measure creates the appearance, but not the actuality, of taking action on smoking and health. However, the main at-risk population of people who smoke was born well before 2009 and is now middle-aged and disproportionately from disadvantaged backgrounds.  For them, switching to safer products is a great option, either as an end in itself or on the way to complete abstinence. But the Bill does nothing for them; in fact, it puts barriers in their way.

3. Blocking stopping smoking. Under the cover of doing something about smoking (but not in reality), the Bill sets up a bunch of anti-vaping and anti-harm reduction measures and powers. These are part of a broader abstinence-only hostility, also expressed in policies outside the Bill (the vape tax, disposables ban, and ministers’ rhetoric). The policy intent matters for major measures that can be agreed with minimal scrutiny in secondary legislation.  These policies will reduce the impact of vaping and other safer alternatives on smoking. By creating practical impediments, raising costs, implicitly miscommunicating risks, and degrading the appeal of alternatives to cigarettes, they work against switching from high-risk to low-risk nicotine use and support the harmful incumbent (the cigarette trade).

4. Wrong strategy. Yet the most effective way to address smoking is to go all-in on switching to smoke-free nicotine use and thereby making continuing nicotine use much safer, because nicotine use will continue. This means encouraging substitution from high-risk to low-risk nicotine use, whether for adults stopping smoking by switching or young people diverting from smoking uptake to alternatives. We may not like it, but harm reduction should not start at 18. The way to meet the 2030 target to reduce smoking below 5% and to go further in the 2030s is to migrate nicotine use to much safer non-combustible nicotine products. The Bill and its underlying intent work against that.

5. Simplistic view of youth risk behaviours. Much of this policy and legislation is premised on a simplistic view of youth risk behaviours in which the demand for nicotine from new users mysteriously vanishes in a way that no one expects it to do for other substances like caffeine, alcohol, cannabis, etc. Many of those now taking up vaping would otherwise be smoking, and for them, vaping is a big win. Given the smoking prevalence of 13.8% among 16-17 year olds (Toolkit, 2024), we could arguably wish for more teenage vaping, not less. Finally, young people are harmed by harm to their parents and other significant adults through role-modelling, economic pain, caring burdens and loss and grief. No kid should have to say “my mum has cancer”. Until officials and advisers can wrap their heads around a realistic model of youth risk behaviours and wwelfare, they will continue to make popular (populist?) but false claims about youth nicotine use.

6. Political parties are humiliating themselves. Labour (party of the poor and disadvantaged), Tories (party of liberty), Lib-Dems (party of individual responsibility) have slavishly marched through the lobbies for legislation that runs counter to their values and will do more harm than good. (See here for a more complete take). 

It is embarrassing.

I have written about this in more depth, elaborating on the points above:

• Why is anyone supporting the UK Tobacco and Vapes Bill? (7 July 2025)
• UK Tobacco and Vapes Bill: a misfire and a backfire (4 May 2024)

I have yet to hear a coherent argument from any of the 1,200 health leaders against the analysis above. I guess they think the legislation is the win, not the outcome.

If there is an argument – bring it.